Radicalism in Ali Jinnah's Land, Religion or Group Matters?

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Abstract

This article examines the issue of radicalism in Pakistan, often identified as the "Land of Ali Jinnah," reflecting the values and vision of its founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Radicalism has been a deep-seated issue in Pakistan, with debates over whether religious or group factors play a more critical role in strengthening radical movements in the country. This article examines the historical development of radicalism in Pakistan, analyzes the factors that influence the spread of radical ideology, and considers the implications of this view on regional and global stability. Through a comprehensive analytical approach, it explores the role of religion as a central element in radicalism in Pakistan, highlighting the role of incorrect or extreme religious understandings in motivating individuals to engage in radical activity. It also examines how group factors such as economic inequality, political discontent and ethnic tensions are essential in strengthening radical movements in Pakistan. The result is that some extremist thinking is based on some of the conservative madrassa education curricula, and some people who lack access to education are, therefore, easily duped and pitted by vested interests. The importance of understanding the balance between religion and group factors in the context of radicalism in Pakistan is that prevention and countermeasures can be more effective. This investigation provides greater insight into the complexity of the issue. It provides a basis for formulating better strategies to address radicalism in the country, which will positively impact regional and global peace and stability.

Contribution: This study contributes to a deeper understanding of radicalism in Pakistan by highlighting the interplay between extreme religious interpretations and socio-political conditions, providing a foundation for more effective counter-radicalism strategies.

Keywords: *Extremism, Radicalism in Pakistan, Prevention of Radicalism, Conservative Religious Education.*

Abstrak

Artikel ini mengkaji masalah radikalisme di Pakistan, yang sering kali diidentifikasi sebagai "Tanah Ali Jinnah," yang mencerminkan nilai-nilai dan visi pendirinya, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Radikalisme telah menjadi isu yang mendalam di Pakistan, dengan perdebatan apakah faktor agama atau faktor kelompok yang memainkan peran yang lebih penting dalam memperkuat gerakan-gerakan radikal di negara ini. Artikel ini membahas sejarah perkembangan radikalisme di Pakistan, menganalisis faktor-faktor yang memengaruhi penyebaran ideologi radikal, dan mempertimbangkan implikasi yang muncul dari pandangan ini terhadap stabilitas regional dan global. Melalui pendekatan analisis komprehensif, artikel ini mengeksplorasi peran agama sebagai elemen sentral dalam radikalisme di Pakistan, dengan menyoroti peran pemahaman agama yang salah atau ekstrem dalam memotivasi individu untuk terlibat dalam aktivitas radikal. Selain itu, artikel ini juga mencermati bagaimana faktor kelompok seperti ketidaksetaraan ekonomi, ketidakpuasan politik, dan ketegangan etnis memainkan peran penting dalam memperkuat gerakan-gerakan radikal di Pakistan. Hasilnya bahwa sebagian corak pemikiran ekstrimis didasari dengan beberapa kurikulum pendidikan madrasah yang konservatif dan sebagian masyarakat yang minim akses pendidikan sehingga mudah dikelabui dan diadu domba oleh orang berkepentingan. Pentingnya memahami keseimbangan antara agama dan faktor kelompok dalam konteks radikalisme di Pakistan adalah agar upaya pencegahan dan penanggulangan dapat menjadi lebih efektif. Penyelidikan

ini memberikan wawasan yang lebih mendalam tentang kompleksitas masalah ini dan memberikan dasar untuk merumuskan strategi yang lebih baik dalam mengatasi radikalisme di negara ini, yang pada gilirannya akan berdampak positif pada perdamaian dan stabilitas regional dan global.

Kontribusi: Penelitian ini berkontribusi pada pemahaman yang lebih mendalam tentang radikalisme di Pakistan dengan menyoroti interaksi antara interpretasi agama yang ekstrem dan kondisi sosial-politik, serta memberikan landasan bagi strategi penanggulangan radikalisme yang lebih efektif.

Kata Kunci: *Ekstremisme, Radikalisme di Pakistan, Pencegahan Radikalisme, Pendidikan Agama Konservatif.*

Introduction

Radicalism in Pakistan has become a serious threat that undermines a country's stability and disrupts the region.[1] Pakistan has come under international scrutiny for this issue, and the question that arises is whether religion or group factors are more influential in influencing individuals towards the path of radicalism.[2] Radicalism in Pakistan has snowballed into a serious threat, shaking the foundations of the country's stability and spreading to neighboring regions. This phenomenon has attracted international attention and raised questions about the role of religion and group factors in pushing individuals down the path of radicalism. Pakistan's multifaceted and complicated history, with its deep religious roots, creates a complex foundation for understanding how radicalism develops in the country. Pakistan was established as an Islamic state in 1947, and the vision of its founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, reflected the determination to create a state based on Islamic principles.[3]

However, various factors have contributed to the growth of radicalism over time. On one hand, militant groups and radical movements that use religion as a tool to achieve their political goals have emerged and gained support in some cases.[4] They capitalize on political discontent, economic inequality, and ethnic tensions in Pakistani society to recruit and motivate new members.[5] On the other hand, incorrect or extreme religious understandings have also played an

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[1] Sharif Shuja, "Pakistan: Islam, Radicalism and the Army," *International Journal on World Peace* 24, no. 2 (2007): 25–35.

[2] Samra Hameed and Gulshan Majeed, "Radicalism in Pakistan: An Analytical Perspective," *Journal of Development and Social Sciences* 3, no. 2 (June 30, 2022): 435–46, https://doi.org/10.47205/jdss.2022(3-II)42.

[3] Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, *Islamist Networks : The Afghan-Pakistan Connection* (Hurst Publishers, 2004), https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03393053.

[4] Khalid A. Mufti, Ali Ahsan Mufti, and Michaeline Bresnahan, "The Army Public School Massacre in Peshawar, Pakistan," in *An International Perspective on Disasters and Children's Mental Health*, ed. Christina W. Hoven, Lawrence V. Amsel, and Sam Tyano, Integrating Psychiatry and Primary Care (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019), 63–71, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15872-9_4.

[5] Kiren Aziz Chaudhry and Peter McDonough, "State, Society, and Sin: The Political Beliefs of University Students in Pakistan," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 32, no. 1 (October 1983): 11–44, https://doi.org/10.1086/451370.

important role in drawing individuals into radicalism.[6] Excessive or erroneous interpretations of religious teachings have become a means of justifying acts of violence and terrorism.

Radicalism in Pakistan has become one of the major issues threatening the stability of the country and the region. The question often arises about whether religious or group factors are more important in leading individuals to radicalism. In recent decades, the country has been at the center of global attention regarding radical issues, especially with the rise of militant groups such as the Pakistani Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba.[7] Since its formation in 1947, Pakistan has faced complex internal dynamics, particularly with regard to religion and national identity. The country was founded on the ideology of Islam, which served as its moral and political foundation. However, in recent decades, incorrect or extreme interpretations of religion have driven many individuals to engage in radical and terrorist activities.[8] Militant movements such as the Pakistani Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba have emerged as significant players in Pakistan's radicalism scene, with their acts of violence threatening domestic security and sending waves of instability across the South Asian region.[9]

Terrorist attacks in Pakistan peaked in 2013, with an average of just under four attacks per day and a total death toll of nearly 2,700 people. Recent trends suggest that 2023 may be even worse, with nearly 200 terror-related incidents and at least 340 fatalities occurring in March. 2022 set the tone for the following months, with December ending the year as the deadliest month for Pakistani security forces for more than a decade. A total of 282 military and police personnel are among the 973 total fatalities in 2022.[10] At the heart of this violence is the new terror triad. It consists of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Baloch Ethnic Liberation Army (BLA), and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), the regional branch of ISIS.[11] One immediate explanation for the unprecedented spate of terrorism was the unilateral cancellation of a year-

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[6] Akbar S. Ahmed, *Religion and Politics in Muslim Society: Order and Conflict in Pakistan* (Cambridge University Press, 1983).

[7] Stephen Tankel, *Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba* (Oxford University Press, 2013).

[8] Munir Ahmad, Muhammad Javad Iqbal Khan, and Zahra Shahid, "Challenges of Deradicalization in Pakistan," *Pakistan Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 10, no. 2 (June 30, 2022): 711–19, https://doi.org/10.52131/pjhss.2022.1002.0236.

[9] Vyacheslav Belokrenitsky, "Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia: The Influence of Pakistan and Afghanistan," in *Central Asia at the End of the Transition* (Routledge, 2005).

[10] Imtiaz Gul, "Explaining the resurgence of terrorist violence in Pakistan," March 29, 2023, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/03/29/explaining-the-resurgence-of-terrorist-violence-in-pakistan/.

[11] Madiha Afzal, "Pakistans Ambivalent Approach toward a Resurgent Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan," February 11, 2022, https://policycommons.net/artifacts/4142188/pakistans-ambivalent-approach-toward-a-resurgent-tehrik-e-taliban-pakistan/4951169/.

old ceasefire on November 28, 2022, by the TTP, which blamed the government for 'breaking commitments' and criticized Pakistani security forces for their actions across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Afghan province of Balochistan.

The question of whether religion or group factors are more dominant in fueling radicalism has been the subject of ongoing debate among experts, governments, and the international community. This article discusses the various factors influencing the rise of radicalism in Pakistan and analyzes whether religion or societal group tensions have a stronger influence on this dynamic. With a better understanding of these issues, efforts to prevent and address radicalism in Pakistan can become more targeted and effective with the hope that the country can achieve its founding vision as a state based on moderate Islamic values and continue to play a positive role in regional and global stability.

This research used a comprehensive analytical approach to understand the role of religion and group factors in radicalism in Pakistan. Data was obtained from various document sources such as academic reports, journal articles, books, government publications, and news sources related to radicalism in Pakistan. [12] This information was used to establish the background and understand the historical development of radicalism in the country. In addition, the research used a case study approach to deepen the understanding of the role of religion and group factors in several relevant incidents of radicalism in Pakistan.[13] In-depth research into these cases helped identify patterns and trends in individuals' motivations to engage in radical activities. By incorporating these various research methods, this study aims to provide a deeper understanding of the complexity of the problem of radicalism in Pakistan, and the results are expected to provide a solid basis for formulating more effective policy recommendations in addressing this challenge.

Patterns of Thought of the Ulama in Pakistan

Since the arrival of Islam in Pakistan, many figures have continued to emerge from the land of Hindustan, namely Ahmad bin Abdul Ahad Sirhindi, a leading Sufi, Shah Waliullah Ad Dahlawi, a famous Hadith expert from the land of Hindustan. Islamic madrassas and seminaries

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[12] Miza Nina Adlini et al., "Metode Penelitian Kualitatif Studi Pustaka," *Edumaspul: Jurnal Pendidikan* 6, no. 1 (March 1, 2022): 974–80, https://doi.org/10.33487/edumaspul.v6i1.3394.

[13] John Lofland, "Styles of Reporting Qualitative Field Research," *The American Sociologist* 9, no. 3 (1974): 101–11.

have also begun to develop, including the Deobandi madrassa. [14] The Deobandi madrasa, founded by Muhammad Qosim Nanutavi on May 30, 1866, is located in India where the Sunni Deobandi Islamic movement began. Deoband is claimed to be the first center of Hindustani-style education, which has a moderate attitude towards the madhhab and respects the differences of the madhhab imams in Islam.

As described by Muhammad Tayyib in his book "Ulamai Deoband, Aqidah wa Manhajan". This madrasa is located in Deoband, a town in the Saharanpur district, Uttar Pradesh, India. The Daarul Ulum Deoband Madrasah adheres to the Hanafi madhhab in fiqh and Maturudi in aqidah.[15] Deoband scholars contributed greatly to spreading Islamic propagation in South Asia; they established educational institutions, gave fatwas, and printed Islamic books in Pakistan. Deobandi Madrassahs, by 2017, has 13,700 educational institutions with 2,770,000 students spread throughout Pakistan.[16] Deoband clerics were also at the forefront of resistance during the British colonization of India and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

Deoband scholars believed that Muslims could not live peacefully under British rule because the British form of government and worldview did not follow Islamic law. A Muslim must be able to harmonize the ahkam of Islamic law in all aspects of life in this world and hereafter. It was not understood by the British, who colonized India at the time. The movement against British colonizers in May 1857 by Muhammad Qasim Nanutavi, the founder of the Daarul Ulum Deobandi madrasa in Meerut, Uttar Pradesh, India. This movement was supported by all levels of Muslim society, especially by Muslims who felt oppressed by British colonialism.[17] Likewise, when the Ottoman Turkish Caliphate was at war with Russia, Qosim Nanautawi donated thousands of rupees to the Uthmanid Dynasty to fully support the Islamic Caliphate.[18] When the British established the Government in India, the Deoband Ulama, under the leadership of Rashid Ahmad Ganggohi, first sanctioned and called for resistance against the British.[19]

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[14] Ghazali Munir, "Pemikiran Pembaruan Teologi Islam Syah Wali Allah Ad-Dahlawi," *Jurnal Theologia* 23, no. 1 (September 4, 2017): 17–35, https://doi.org/10.21580/teo.2012.23.1.1757.

[15] Barbara Metcalf, "The Madrasa at Deoband: A Model for Religious Education in Modern India," *Modern Asian Studies* 12, no. 1 (February 1978): 111–34, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X00008179.

[16] Jaddon Park and Sarfaroz Niyozov, "Madrasa Education in South Asia and Southeast Asia: Current Issues and Debates," *Asia Pacific Journal of Education* 28, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 323–51, https://doi.org/10.1080/02188790802475372.

[17] Muhammad Ruslan, *Sejarah Pemikiran Pendirian Negara Pakistan* (Deepublish, 2015).

[18] Luqman Al Hakim, "Politik Jihad Turki Utsmani Pada Perang Dunia Pertama," *Rihlah: Jurnal Sejarah dan Kebudayaan* 9, no. 1 (June 30, 2021): 58–71, https://doi.org/10.24252/rihlah.v9i1.19113.

[19] Barbara D. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900* (Princeton University Press, 2014).

By the time the Ottoman Caliphate fell under British rule, Deoband clerics were the first to offer resistance against the British. From 1913 to 1920, Deobandi leaders declared the Tehreek-e Reshmi Rumal (Silk Mail Movement), a movement that aimed to gain Indian independence from British rule by allying with the Ottoman Turkish Caliphate, the Emirate of Afghanistan and the German Empire.[20] It was written on silk by Mahmud Hasan Deobandi and addressed to Ubaidillah Sindhi one of the Deoband leaders in Afghanistan.[21] At the time of the partition of India-Pakistan in 1947, Deoband scholars played a leading role in the founding of the Jamiiat Ulama-e Hind (Society of Indian Scholars) as it opposed the partition of India-Pakistan and took the position that Muslims and non-Muslims were one nation.[22]

This led to internal divisions within the *Jamiiat Ulama-e Hind* (JUH), leading one group of scholars with opposing views to leave and establish *Jamiiat Ulama-e Islam* (JUI) and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan movement. In the movement to establish the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Deobandi scholars also argued that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan could become a laboratory for shar'i legislation in the world after the collapse of the Ottoman Turkish Caliphate.[23] Ashraf Ali Thanwi and Syabr Ahmad Usmani were the two main figures who birthed this idea from Daarul Ulum Deoband. Another movement that was the mother of Jaamiiat Ulama-e Islam (JUI), Jamiaat Ulama-e Hind (JUH), eventually focused on fighting for the rights of oppressed Muslims in India.

Madrassas and its Impact on Society in Pakistan

Mosques and madrasas (Islamic educational institutions) played a major role in the early days of Islam. Madrassas were responsible for planning and strategizing to counter thoughts that were not in line with the developed schools of Islam. Madrasahs were also responsible for discussing the core values of Islam to organize the Islamic system in the country.[24] The Islamic education system encompasses all aspects of the world and the hereafter, with the mosque being the central center for education, and this tradition is maintained to this day. At the beginning of

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[20] Stanford Mc Krause, *Islam di India dan Cina* (Cambridge Stanford Books, n.d.).

[21] A. N. Khan, "Mawlana Mahmud Al-Hasan (1851-to 1920): His Contribution to Dar-Ul-Uloom, Deoband," *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society* 33, no. 2 (1985): 123.

[22] Dr Muhammad Naveed Akhtar, "Darul Ulum Deoband Movement:Anti Imperialist Struggle,Conventional Religious Education And Stance On Nationalism," *International Research Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities* 1, no. 2 (December 31, 2022): 1–11.

[23] Husnul Amin, "Mainstream Islamism without Fear. The Cases of Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam in Pakistan," *Romanian Journal of Political Sciences* 14, no. 02 (2014): 126–57.

[24] Asma Afsaruddin, "The 'Islamic State': Genealogy, Facts, and Myths," *Journal of Church and State* 48, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 153–73, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcs/48.1.153.

Islam, Muslims received teachings directly from Prophet Muhammad and his Companions. The Prophet Muhammad became the central source of Islam in answering Muslims' problems. This concept was hierarchically continued by scholars (heirs of the prophets) by organizing the madrasah system (Islamic School).[25] There are two characters who come to study at Madrasah: one who wants to gain scientific insight into Islam from the Qur'an and hadith to strengthen his understanding and fight for his religion, and the other who wants guidance and demands in living life in the world.

Since the time of British colonization, the Ulama and Madrasahs have played an important role in providing guidance to the Islamic community in Pakistan. Madrassas became the power base of the common people as well as Muslims in resisting the colonization that existed in India and Pakistan at that time. British colonizers saw the madrassas as a serious threat because of their influence on the wider community. The strategy of the British colonizers at that time was to make non-religious institutions a top priority for the people of India-Pakistan, because they were unable to stem and control the movement of madrasas in their colonies.[26]

Discrimination against madrassas continued over time, leading to serious resistance from the Ulama of the time; in 1857, 34 ulama spearheaded by Qasim Nanautavi, Zamin Shaheed and Rasheed Ahmad Ganggohi proclaimed a jihad against the British known as the Battle of Shamli. Two hundred thousand people died in the Mutyni area, of which 51,200 were clerics. In the 19th century, Muslims lost their glory with the collapse of the Uthmanid Caliphate at the hands of the British. It led to a huge movement of ulema against British colonialism in Pakistan.[27] During the Anglo-Indian war in 1857, the modern Islamic intellectual Sir Sayid Ahmad Khan adopted an educational strategy of incorporating the British curriculum and evoking Westernized Islamic thinkers scientifically and educationally by establishing Aligarh University. On the other hand, theological scholars from the Sub-Continent denounced the British Western educational curriculum and considered it irrelevant to Islamic identity.[28] The two major madrassas that

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[25] Asma Afsaruddin, *The First Muslims: History and Memory* (Simon and Schuster, 2013).

[26] Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Religious Education and the Rhetoric of Reform: The Madrasa in British India and Pakistan," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41, no. 2 (April 1999): 294–323, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417599002091.

[27] R.A. Geaves, "India 1857: A Mutiny or a War of Independence? The Muslim Perspective," *Islamic Studies* 35, no. 1 (1996): 25–44.

[28] Zen Amrullah, "Gerakan Aligarh Di India (Refleksi Historis Gerakan Modernisme Pendidikan Sayyid Ahmad Khan)," *Journal TA'LIMUNA* 10, no. 2 (October 2, 2021): 40–51, https://doi.org/10.32478/talimuna.v10i2.772.

pioneered this movement were Darul Uloom Deoband (1866) and Nadwatul Ulama, Lucknow (1893), which were independent from the control of the British government at the time.[29]

Nadwatul Ulama is a madrasa that was established to transform the adaptive knowledge of Islamic fundamentalists when Muslims in the sub-continent (India and Pakistan) were divided into two views, Modernist and orthodox thinking.[30] Likewise, Darul Uloom Deoband, a madrasa founded in 1867 by Rashid Ahmad and Muhammad Qasim to continue the legitimacy of Islamic thought in the 18th century, namely Shah Waliyullah Dahlawi to revolutionize the Western education system which was highlighted as the degradation of European Impreialism education developed by Western Orientalists.[31] During the birth of the new Republic of Pakistan in 1947, madrassas continued their existence as agents of freedom in India and Pakistan, and they were greatly appreciated for their contributions and achievements in the Muslim community. At the resolution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1949, where the government differed on the concept of the Islamic Republic and the constitution of Pakistan, new hope emerged from Islamic political parties. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), and Jamiat Ulama-e-Pakistan (JUP) played an important role in the political system of Pakistan at that time.[32] Scholars from different sectors and manhajs in this affiliation forgot their differences to unite to legalize constitutional Islam in Pakistan from 1948 to 1956.

In 1980, Fazal-ur-Rehman, a Deoband figure influenced by Mahmud Hasan Deobandi, became the general secretary of the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI), a splinter group of the Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind (JUH) formed by Muhammad Kifayatullah and Sayyid Hasan Ahmad Madani. Fazal-ur-Rehman is a pro-Taliban politician known for his closeness to the Afghan Islamic Imarah. He seeks to rebrand the ulama as moderate figures without connections to religious extremists and hardliners.[33] Some Western scholars, such as Cristopher M. Blauchard, claim that most of the curriculum in Pakistani madrasas is religiously radicalized; students are mentally and psychologically trained to give resistance to their enemies and are trained not to trust them.[34]

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[29] Ali Riaz, "Madrassah Education in Pre-Colonial and Colonial South Asia," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 46, no. 1 (February 1, 2011): 69–86, https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909610387758.

[30] Shafiqul Islam Ansary, "Major Centres of Arabic and Islamic Studies in India," *International Journal of Health Sciences*, April 6, 2022, 3590–3602, https://doi.org/10.53730/ijhs.v6nS1.5505.

[31] Akhtar, "DARUL ULUM DEOBAND MOVEMENT."

[32] Babar Shah, "Myth of Talibanisation of Pakistan," *Strategic Studies* 21, no. 3 (2001): 50–77.

[33] Mohamed Nawab bin Mohamed Osman, "The Ulama in Pakistani Politics," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 32, no. 2 (August 1, 2009): 230–47, https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400903049499.

[34] Cofie D. Malbouisson, *Focus on Islamic Issues* (Nova Publishers, 2007).

Some articles claim that the madrassa mindset is shaped to combat overtly Western cultural characteristics.[35] Alan K. Kronstadt asserts some madrassas support underground movements for terrorism and violence, claiming some madrassas in Pakistan are financially supported by the religious party Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) led by Fazlur Rahman who is affiliated with Deobandi madrassa thought. Fazlur Rahman had intimate relations with Sipah-e-Sahaba (S.S), a unit under Jamaat-al-Da'wa (J.D). Jamaat-al-Da'wa (J.D) is a militant Islamic organization operating in Eastern Afghanistan, which has close ties with Laskar-e-Taeba, a militant organization operating against India in Pakistan that Osama bin Laden funded during the Soviet-Afghanistan war.[36]

International attention began to increase in 2005 when Pakistan officially recognized that the suspects of the terrorist agenda in the London attacks were linked to the conservative teaching system in madrassas; Umbreen Javaid stated that, directly or indirectly, there was a connection between madrassas and extremism. He also stated that anti-Russianism was playing underground behind madrassas with financial support to provoke students to jihad in Afghanistan.[37] They also massively conduct training and indoctrination related to extremism. The world's traumatic response to the September 11 incident has further worsened the image of madrasas as factories for producing young jihadists with extremist views.

Social Conditions of the People of Pakistan

Pakistani society is a new society born out of the separation of the mother country from the old Indian state; Pakistani society is a child born out of the mother society of the old Indian state and forms a new community of people. Pakistani society was born on August 14, 1947; on the day of its birth, it faced new problems, new borders, new expectations, imaginations about new nationalism, and people from various ethnicities who had just joined.[38] A society in a geophysical setting with a mix of Eastern and Western cultures has yet to be seen to exist in history. Hence, with the establishment of Pakistan on a new frontier, a new mixed-ethnic population and a different society was born. It not only created a new state but a new society as well.[39]

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[35] Nikhil Raymond Puri, "The Pakistani Madrassah and Terrorism: Made and Unmade Conclusions from the Literature," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 4, no. 4 (2010): 51–72.

[36] K Alan Kronstadt, "Education Reform in Pakistan," n.d.

[37] Umbreen Javaid, "War on Terror: Pakistan's Apprehensions," *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 5, no. 3 (2011): 125–31.

[38] Sarah Ansari, "Subjects or Citizens? India, Pakistan and the 1948 British Nationality Act," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41, no. 2 (June 1, 2013): 285–312, https://doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2013.768094.

[39] James Wynbrandt, *A Brief History of Pakistan* (Infobase Publishing, 2009).

In the case of its birth, the people of Pakistan were faced with a cruel and harsh environment. At that time, Pakistan did not have enough soldiers to protect its borders. On the other hand, more than six million Muslim refugees from East Punjab, Kashmir and several states in India came to Pakistan.[40] At the same time, a large group of 5-6 million Hindus and Sikhs left West Pakistan for India. During that time, approximately one million civilians were threatened with murder and torture, and millions were left homeless and hungry after independence. Just two months after Pakistan's independence, it was subjected to the first of four rolling attacks by India to defend Jammu and Kashmir. The then Maharaja of Kashmir signed an instrument of accession with India on October 26, 1947, to subjugate the Muslim majority there.[41] India sent its army into Kashmir in October 1947 in response to the Kashmiri Maharaja's plea. The then commander of the British-Pakistan army did not approve of his commander's order to invade Kashmir. However, the India-Pakistan war continued until late December 1948.[42] Over time, the Kashmir conflict developed into a showcase of power, rights, values and political attitudes between India and Pakistan. Similarly, the finances of the new state of Pakistan at that time were drained and allocated to resolve internal conflicts within the country.

On April 1, 1948, the people of Punjab in India stopped the canal water flowing into the Punjab in Pakistan. It was hoped that this would disrupt the stability of their society. This polemic added homework for the nascent nation. During this crisis, Pakistan's founding national figure died on September 11, 1948, just 11 months after Pakistan declared its independence.[43] A sense of inferiority and hopelessness began to overshadow the new nation. Distrust and low self-esteem have plagued the Pakistani people since the birth of the country, and this was the face of Pakistani society in the country's early days.

Pakistan and Terrorism

Radicalism and terrorism have complex root causes, not only related to political factors, economics, law enforcement, social welfare, and international issues but also to ideological factors. Differences in interpretation and understanding between one party and another will give

[40] Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, "Kashmir, India and Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs* 43 (1965 1964): 528.

[41] Ed K. R. Gupta, *India-Pakistan Relations with Special Reference to Kashmir* (Atlantic Publishers & Dist, 2006).

[42] Gowher Rizvi, "India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Problem, 1947-1972," in *Perspectives On Kashmir* (Routledge, 1992).

[43] Hira Sikhawat and Azmat Ullah, "Crisis Of Leadership In The Politics Of Pakistan (1948-1958)," *Russian Law Journal* 11, no. 12s (June 3, 2023), https://russianlawjournal.org/index.php/journal/article/view/2319.

birth to differences in the appearance of Islam itself. It is important for Muslims to have a correct understanding of Islam from authentic sources, both religious texts and history, as well as through transforming knowledge from moderate scholars and experts, which is one method of counteracting radicalism.[44] It is very concerning for Muslims to see a group of people, especially young people, who are enthusiastic to raise the flag of Islam and preach in the wrong way. The result of ignorance wrapped in excessive religious fervour encourages acts of anarchism and extremism in religion.

The phenomenon of radicalism and the things associated with it, including in terms of understanding and movement, are things that do not have historical roots (adh-dakhil) in Islamic teachings. The term At-Tatharruf (Radicalism) comes from the Western world, its meaning is a political philosophy that states the need to look for all forms of injustice and tyranny in the social system to be alleviated, while according to the ulama, radicalism is interpreted as misguidance and violation of Sharia. Terrorism/Radicalism is choosing the path of violence by exceeding the limits of moderation and injustice and refusing to take the path of gentleness and tolerance.[45]

In religion, the meaning of terrorism/radicalism is to understand something rigidly so that it exceeds the limits of moderation; the emphasis of radicalism is more on violence in mindset, while terrorism is not only on violence in mindset but also on physical violence and behaviour. Pakistan is confronted by various forms of ideological disputes of terrorism in the form of networks and organizations. Some of their brutality is local, and some are indoctrinated and supported by outsiders. By nature, the ideology of extremists and their groups is exclusive, monopolistic, puritanical and totalitarian.[46]

Although the incidents of the 9/11 tragedy were affirmed to have had ulterior motives in the emergency and were played out by the group responsible, this brutality became a black mark in world history. At the same time, several militant groups flourished between 1970 and 1980 in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Middle East. [47] Some joined martial law during the Iranian Revolution (1979) and when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan (1979). During that time,

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[44] Mubaidi Sulaeman, "Permainan Bahasa Atas Tuduhan Gerakan Fundamentalisme Islam Dalam Politik Barat," *Kontemplasi: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin* 7, no. 1 (2019): 55–72.

[45] Wasisto Raharjo Jati, "Radicalism In The Perspective Of Islamic-Populism: Trajectory of Political Islam in Indonesia," *JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM* 7, no. 2 (December 1, 2013): 268–87, https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2013.7.2.268-287.

[46] Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance* (London: Routledge, 1995), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203074763.

[47] Javaid, "War on Terror: Pakistan's Apprehensions."

General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) played a role in accommodating and contributing to the cause of Islam. General Zia-ul-Haq launched the Islamic Shari'a program to change the fabric of Muslim society. However, this program suppressed and inhibited the development of liberal and secular thought in Pakistan.[48] At that time, Islamic Shariah was implemented in various segments of Pakistani society. In this context, mosques, madrasas and the Islamic press played an important societal role. Furthermore, religious leaders received protection from the government at that time. Everything was measured by Islamic law. During General Zia-ul-Haq's time, the Project successfully promoted the zakat system and made Deoband clerics influential figures in Pakistan.[49] Deobandi clerics greatly influenced the spirit of jihad to fight the existing discord in the society. Moreover, the madrassa graduates were involved in the Afghan war (1979-1989) against the Soviet Union and the superpower United States. Zia-ul-Haq also purchased Kalashnikov rifles and some artillery to support facilities to fight terrorism and extremism in Pakistan.[50]

The pre-September 11, 2001 terrorist activities in Pakistan were a series of incidents spawned by several separatist groups. Some of the ideologies that motivated the critical and anti-government movements began to emerge during the regime of General Pervaiz Musharraf and used this movement as a justification for the government to launch several acts of violence throughout the country. This policy was implemented to support the United States in its war on terror propaganda and its enlightened moderation program for Pakistan.[51] Under this program, President Musharraf showed a comprehensive attitude to reforming the formal education system in Pakistan as best he could.

Likewise, madrasahs in Pakistan have been criticized for implementing a system of religious extremism. Madrasas are accused of spreading the idea of rejecting Westernization behind the Pakistani government's agenda of promoting secularism. Some Islamist groups used this momentum to criticize the government and clerics for engaging in Westernized enlightenment moderation programs. Pakistan's main ally at the time, the United States, with its propaganda

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[48] Aisyah A, "Nasionalisme Dan Pembentukan Negara Islam Pakistan," *Jurnal Politik Profetik* 2, no. 2 (2014), https://doi.org/10.24252/profetik.v2i2a2.

[49] Fitri Wulandari, "Islam dan Demokrasi di Pakistan," *El Tarikh : Journal of History, Culture and Islamic Civilization* 2, no. 1 (May 24, 2021): 24–36, https://doi.org/10.24042/jhcc.v2i1.7882.

[50] Asep Syamsul M. Romli, *Demonologi Islam: upaya barat membasmi kekuatan Islam* (Gema Insani, 2000).

[51] Mun'im A. Sirry, *Membendung militansi agama: iman dan politik dalam masyarakat modern* (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2003).

against terror, was heavily criticized by Islamists, who launched anti-government attacks. Some of the Islamist groups that launched these attacks include Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella organization that oversees 40 militant groups, they are based in Pakistan's "Tribal Areas" (areas bordering Afghanistan) and have representatives in southern Punjab, Lasykar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) Jammat-ul-Ahrar (JAH).[52]

According to reports, they have slaughtered more than 10,000 Pakistani civilians, and this has given the Musharraf regime an excuse to launch a propaganda war on terror with an estimated economic loss due to this act of terrorism of several million US Dollars. Generally, the counter-terrorism movement refers to the response to action against terror. With a comprehensive combination of soft and hard power to effectively reduce acts of terror in Pakistan. The Pakistani army has launched several military operations to counter-terrorism; so far, military operations have been held after September 9, 2001, to protect the government.[53]

Operation Al Mizan (2002-2006) in southern Waziristan aimed at fighting Al-Qaeda and Taliban which resulted in approximately 1,400 casualties, Operation Zalzala (2008) in southern Waziristan aimed at capturing Qari Hussain Ahmad Mehsud the leader of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Operation Syerdil in Bajaur launched to end the movement of Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Al-Qaeda Command Center to conduct activities in Northeast Afghanistan. Operations Rah-e-Haq and Rah-e-Rast (2007-2009) in Swat between the Pakistani Military and the Taliban and the subsequent Operation Rah-e-Nijat in southern Waziristan, which began on June 19, 2009.[54] The Zareb-i-Azb military operation launched on June 15, 2014, in Northern Waziristan along the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan against a combination of militant groups such as Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, The East Turkestan Islamic Movement, Lashkar-e-Jangvi, Al-Qaeda, Jundallah and Haqqani Network. These military operations are part of the government's efforts to combat terrorism.[55]

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[52] N. Elahi, *Terrorism in Pakistan: The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Challenge to Security* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019).

[53] Sanjoy Banerjee and Gitika Commuri, "A Strange and Bittersweet Relationship: Pakistan–United States Relations in the Musharraf Era," *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* 1, no. 1 (April 1, 2014): 41–61, https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797013518404.

[54] Marie Lall and Tania Saeed, *Youth and the National Narrative: Education, Terrorism and the Security State in Pakistan* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019).

[55] Azmat Wazir, "Taliban Taliban's Government in Afghanistan and the Dilemmas of Pakistan," *FWU Journal of Social Sciences* 17, no. 2 (July 5, 2023), http://121.52.146.40/fwu-journal/index.php/ojss/article/view/1881.

The peak of terrorist attacks in Pakistan was recorded in 2013, when an average of nearly four attacks occurred daily, and the total death toll approached 2,700. Recent data shows a worrying trend, with 2023 likely to be an even more difficult year, with nearly 200 terror incidents and at least 340 fatalities in March alone. Deobandi clerics greatly influenced the spirit of jihad to fight the existing discord in the society. Moreover, the madrassa graduates were involved in the Afghan war (1979-1989) against the Soviet Union and the superpower United States. Zia-ul-Haq also purchased Kalashnikov rifles and some artillery to support facilities to fight terrorism and extremism in Pakistan.[56] At the heart of this violent situation lies the existence of a troubling new terror triad consisting of three main entities: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Baloch Ethnic Liberation Army (BLA), and Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), the regional branch of ISIS.[57] One of the key elements in the unprecedented string of terror events was the TTP's unilateral cancellation of its year-long ceasefire on November 28, 2022. The group blamed the government for a 'breach of commitment'. It criticized Pakistani security forces for their actions in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region and Balochistan province bordering Afghanistan.[58]

The TTP demands the return of the special status of seven border areas revoked in May 2018, as well as the release of dozens of detained members. They also want the withdrawal of the Pakistani army from currently outlawed areas to establish their Islamic caliphate. Islamabad, however, regards these demands as non-negotiable. In the face of the escalating crackdown since early 2021, the TTP, which no longer exists in Pakistan, has retreated to the safety of Afghanistan, especially after the Afghan Taliban returned to power in August 2021. TTP leaders, including their chairman, Noor Wali Mehsud, now feel safe and secure in Afghanistan.[59]

The practice of freedom enjoyed by TTP leaders in Afghanistan has been one of the controversial points in negotiations with the Afghan Taliban government. Islamabad demands punitive action against the TTP for acts of terror in Pakistan. However, to date, conclusive action

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[56] © Universitas Stanford, Stanford, and Kalifornia 94305, "MMP: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan," accessed September 29, 2023, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan.

[57] Khuram Iqbal and Sara De Silva, "Terrorist Lifecycles: A Case Study of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan," *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 8, no. 1 (April 1, 2013): 72–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2013.789599.

[58] Abid Hussain, "Pakistan Taliban Ends Ceasefire with Gov't, Threatens New Attacks," accessed September 29, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/28/pakistan-taliban-ends-ceasefire-with-govt-threatens-new-attacks.

[59] Yechezkel Yehudah Mehlman and James H. Hess, "A Comparative Analysis of the Afghan Taliban and the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan Ideologies Following the 2021 Takeover of Afghanistan," *Global Security & Intelligence Studies* 7, no. 2 (2023), https://gsis.scholasticahq.com/article/74175.pdf.

against this group does not seem to have been taken by the Afghan government. It is largely related to ethnic factors, as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is home to many Pashtun tribes inhabiting both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and the TTP draws support from this community. The Afghan Taliban, whose majority members are also Pashtun, have ethnic and ideological ties with the TTP. They were previously allied against US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan during the two-decade War on Terror. Therefore, it is not surprising that Pakistan has been pursuing terrorists in the border region, resulting in the movement of many TTP leaders to safety in Afghanistan.[60]

In addition, geopolitical factors may also be contributing to this terrorism situation. In the context of the rivalry between the US and China, groups like the Afghanistan-based East Turkestan Islamic Movement and the ISKP have openly threatened to attack Chinese interests in the region. The ISKP has even published a number of publications highlighting China and its regional interests. China regards these groups as tools of the West seeking to harm its interests, especially in the context of the multi-billion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor - the flagship project of the Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing also questioned why the US revoked the East Turkestan Islamic Movement's status as a 'terrorist organization' in November 2020, while Washington stated that there was no credible evidence to suggest that the group was still active.

As for the causes of various styles of radicalism in Pakistan, according to the author's view, there are several supporting factors. The first is the ghuluw (excessive) attitude of the people in religion, exceeding the limits outlined by the Sharia; Madrasahs and Ulama have an important role in teaching a person's understanding of the correct fiqh, not blind taqlid and thorough teaching of the essence of Islamic teachings and laws. The second factor in the emergence of religious radicalism in Pakistani society is the contamination of groups that feel they have the correct understanding of religion. The ulama in this group then takes extreme fatwas and methods of thinking. The influence of clerics in shaping the mindset of society is very important. Radical and extreme thinking in Pakistan is also signalled by the lockdown of the authority of Islamic culture and science due to the tenuous relationship between the ulama and the government.

The third factor is the lack of interaction of ordinary people with the role of ulama, who have high credibility in Sharia knowledge. In this case, it can be caused by the decline in the image of

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[60] Elahi, *Terrorism in Pakistan*.

the ulama in the public's view so that people prefer groups that separate themselves from society and even fight moderate ulama. The next factor is media contamination, a tool used as propaganda by the enemy to give a negative impression of the government. Another factor is the crisis experienced by Pakistan due to the long war with India, so the wider community needs to understand the theory of how to interact with the crisis.

Likewise, British aggression against India-Pakistan caused resistance from the ulama and Muslim groups in all ways. This attitude was used as a political tool to exploit the disputes between the ulama for certain interests because of the differences in the ulama's ijtihad. Furthermore, influenced by distorted thinking, situations of unrest are usually utilized by radicals to spread the virus of their thinking. In the early days of Pakistan's establishment, Pakistan suffered from poverty, famine and prolonged conflicts, which were used by radicals to ingratiate themselves with the country's common people.

Conclusion

This article has explored the role of religion and group factors in the context of radicalism in Pakistan. Through a comprehensive analytical approach, this research reveals that the problem of radicalism in Pakistan results from a complex interaction between religion and social, economic and political factors. The importance of religious understanding in radicalism must be addressed. An incorrect or extreme understanding of religion has become a catalyst that motivates individuals to engage in radical activities. This factor plays a key role in recruitment and indoctrination, leading to violent acts. However, it cannot be ignored that group factors are also highly influential. Economic inequality, political discontent and ethnic tensions have amplified radical movements in Pakistan. These discontents trigger social tensions that radical groups utilize to gain support. In addition, the problem of radicalism in Pakistan is also related to geopolitical factors.

The presence of terrorist groups in the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan has been a source of regional conflict and tension. This factor plays an important role in conditioning the region's radicalism dynamics. In dealing with this challenge of radicalism, it is important to take a holistic approach. Prevention and countermeasure strategies must understand the complex relationship between religion and group factors and incorporate social, economic and political elements. International efforts must also be made to address this issue, as radicalism in Pakistan

has a region-wide and worldwide impact. In conclusion, radicalism in Pakistan is a multifaceted problem involving religion, group factors and geopolitics. It requires concerted, comprehensive and sustained efforts to ensure regional and global stability and prevent the spread of extreme ideologies.

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